Only somewhat related, but I wonder if there’s a difference between those who grew up before and after the end of the cold war, in terms of their assessments of the subjective risk of nuclear war. I was born in 1986, so I have no memory of the cold war, and I’ve always viewed nuclear war as extremely unlikely. I sometimes wonder if I’m underestimating the risk because of my upbringing (although I think in my case it’s more likely a general bias in favour of the future turning out alright, which I think EY has talked about)
I was born in 1979 and the cold war seemed very much alive back when I became aware of news around, oh, 5. But then it was a matter of ‘can we agree to SALT?’ and my initial reactions of “that the answer is not an immediate ‘yes’ is pretty disturbing.” and “No one’s stupid enough to pull the trigger” both still hold.
What I think has saved us is that they are obviously dangerous. We take them seriously. And whoever uses them does so with the knowledge that they won’t just be sending other people off to die—they, personally, are very likely not going to survive the exchange.
But then it was a matter of ‘can we agree to SALT?’ and my initial reactions of “that the answer is not an immediate ‘yes’ is pretty disturbing.”
Why? The implication seems to be that any nuclear reduction treaty is a good thing. But, to take an extreme example, unilateral nuclear disarmament is obviously not a good idea. Thus, we see that whether a nuclear reduction treaty is a good idea depends on details of the treaty. So no, it should not be disturbing that the answer to can we agree on nuclear reduction treaty X is on an immediate ‘yes’.
If people are ‘maybe not exactly nice but not utterly crazy’, then nuclear deterrence can be achieved against them with a modestly large arsenal on the order of, say, China’s or Britain’s.
Reducing to an amount several times this level (which is more of a reduction than SALT required) would not be much of a concession (even unilaterally, which it wasn’t) if either side trusted the other even that much. So, both sides think that the other is in fact utterly crazy and so they need a massive arsenal. … and so both sides, with extremely low levels of trust, have vastly excessive nuclear arsenals.
This seems a mite unstable.
See… I wasn’t saying that SALT was a no-brainer. I was saying that SALT not being a no-brainer was evidence that things were really screwed up.
Only somewhat related, but I wonder if there’s a difference between those who grew up before and after the end of the cold war, in terms of their assessments of the subjective risk of nuclear war. I was born in 1986, so I have no memory of the cold war, and I’ve always viewed nuclear war as extremely unlikely. I sometimes wonder if I’m underestimating the risk because of my upbringing (although I think in my case it’s more likely a general bias in favour of the future turning out alright, which I think EY has talked about)
I was born in 1979 and the cold war seemed very much alive back when I became aware of news around, oh, 5. But then it was a matter of ‘can we agree to SALT?’ and my initial reactions of “that the answer is not an immediate ‘yes’ is pretty disturbing.” and “No one’s stupid enough to pull the trigger” both still hold.
What I think has saved us is that they are obviously dangerous. We take them seriously. And whoever uses them does so with the knowledge that they won’t just be sending other people off to die—they, personally, are very likely not going to survive the exchange.
Why? The implication seems to be that any nuclear reduction treaty is a good thing. But, to take an extreme example, unilateral nuclear disarmament is obviously not a good idea. Thus, we see that whether a nuclear reduction treaty is a good idea depends on details of the treaty. So no, it should not be disturbing that the answer to can we agree on nuclear reduction treaty X is on an immediate ‘yes’.
I was talking about SALT, and not the least convenient member of the set of nuclear reduction actions one could possibly take.
And what evidence convinced you that SALT was so obviously a good idea that the mere fact of people questioning it was disturbing?
If people are ‘maybe not exactly nice but not utterly crazy’, then nuclear deterrence can be achieved against them with a modestly large arsenal on the order of, say, China’s or Britain’s.
Reducing to an amount several times this level (which is more of a reduction than SALT required) would not be much of a concession (even unilaterally, which it wasn’t) if either side trusted the other even that much. So, both sides think that the other is in fact utterly crazy and so they need a massive arsenal. … and so both sides, with extremely low levels of trust, have vastly excessive nuclear arsenals.
This seems a mite unstable.
See… I wasn’t saying that SALT was a no-brainer. I was saying that SALT not being a no-brainer was evidence that things were really screwed up.